China's Climate Paradox
In June 2015, China submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC), which is United Nations (UN) jargon for a nationwide scheme to cut carbon emissions, to the UN in anticipation of COP-21 this December. The INDC includes decreasing carbon intensity by 60-65%, as compared to 2005 levels, by 2030; increasing the share of renewable energy of total primary energy consumption to 20% by 2030; and peaking carbon emissions by 2030. China’s INDC has been lauded as “historic,” representing a much needed signal to the world that the nation of 1.3 billion people is invested in the success of COP-21. However, as early as 2009, China was considered a rebellious player in climate deliberations, contributing to the collapse of COP-15 in Copenhagen. In light of this history, does China’s INDC represent a genuine change of heart or are there other factors at play?
Pursuant to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), parties to the Convention have “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities,” meaning that the developed countries responsible for most of the greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution have the obligation to cut emissions the most and help developing countries develop in an environmentally friendly way. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC enshrined this principle in policy, with China, as a developing country, not obligated to enact emissions reduction targets. The COP-15 was the culmination of China’s promotion of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” with China taking the position that it would not take additional measures to control the growth of its emissions unless developed countries “drastically slowed their own emissions and gave major aid to China… to help cover the cost of emissions cuts.”[1] This resulted in consternation among the developed nations, and even among small developing countries seeking a positive outcome to COP-15.[2]
President Obama and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during COP-15, 2009
After COP-15, however, China’s approach to international climate governance took a momentous turn. Its climate negotiators in Cancun and Durban became much more receptive to compromise; China in the former agreed to endorse the International Consultation and Analysis Registry, which would mandate that developing countries declare emissions reduction targets, and China in the latter agreed to adhere to a future legally-binding treaty to reduce carbon emissions. With respect to domestic actions, China has been aggressively integrating renewable energy into its energy grid, and is currently the largest global investor in renewable energy. China has also taken unilateral measures to tackle climate change, including shutting down inefficient and outdated coal mines, phasing out the household utilization of charcoal briquettes for cooking and heating, and also installing emissions-scrubbing equipment on new coal-fired power plants.[3] Most recently, China has announced its intention to start a national cap-and-trade program by 2017. What is the rationale behind China’s about-face?
Global New Energy Investment by Region, 2014 ($ in billions) (Source: Bloomberg New Energy Finance)
China’s geography is an appropriate starting point for this analysis. China’s geographical position makes the nation of 1.3 billion much more exposed “than any other major power” to the impacts of global climate change.[4] The Chinese Heartland is vulnerable to arduous water scarcity that is exacerbated by the stresses of agriculture, industry, and residential living, which has forced China to construct canal systems – with social and environmental impacts of their own – to compensate for intensifying drought and drying aquifers.[5] Climate change impacts such as rising sea levels, flooding, and cyclones, will also likely rise in frequency and magnitude, threatening China’s economic growth for years to come.[6] China’s geographical position is also what has allowed it to realize its unparalleled economic growth – with an abundant supply of coal being utilized to meet its soaring domestic energy needs – even while that growth has made China the largest global emitter of greenhouse gas emissions, which worsens the climate problem.[7] Even though China has been insistently developing renewable energy, it has consistently drawn the line in international negotiations at decelerating its pace of economic development to help address global pollution problems it argues were created entirely by the developed world.[8]
When analyzing China’s geography in the context of its domestic security concerns, the apparent gap between the country’s ambitious domestic actions to address climate change and its distrustful stance towards international climate governance is reconcilable. With respect to its energy, coal supplied 69% of China’s overall energy consumption in 2011, an amount that also constituted half of global consumption. There are strategic disadvantages to being so heavily dependent on just one resource to supply the bulk of domestic energy demand, and thus it is in China’s interest to diversify its energy base to make the electric grid more reliable; this explains why China may be pushing to grow the share of hydropower and nuclear power in its aggregate energy consumption, despite the social and environmental problems that also arise from them.[9] Another concern is that coal mining and coal-fired electricity generation require an excessive amount of water, which exacerbates China’s acute water scarcity problem. It should be noted that 66% of China’s domestic coal mining is located in the water-stressed north, while 58% of all coal-fired electricity generation is situated in “high” to “extremely high” water-stressed locations.
Water Availability in China, 2012 (Source: HSBC Global Research)
The unique challenges inherent in Chinese Communist Party rule add another security dimension to the issue of domestic climate change action and international climate governance. The legitimacy of the Party is contingent on its ability to attain economic growth, and by extension, social stability. Some China experts argue that the Party will never make international concerns like climate change a chief priority, as its number one consideration is preserving its power, which means it endeavors to mitigate social unrest.[10] Achieving economic growth and creating jobs has been how China appeases the population, which is why China’s economic deceleration has been so worrying to the Party. This is also why municipal leaders have had difficulty reconciling economic growth with environmental regulations. In this respect, the inevitable transition to a low-carbon economy is vital to China insofar as it generates jobs—and the transition would create plenty of jobs in the remediation and green sectors.[11] Utilizing renewable energy, and by extension displacing coal, has also had the double benefit of thwarting air pollution generated principally from coal-fired power plants. Indeed, China’s air pollution problem has led to so much social discontent that former senior Communist Party leader Chen Jiping conceded it is now the single greatest cause of social unrest in China.[12] With the fine particles in the air exceeding international standards many times over, and children as young as eight years of age getting cancer, countless Chinese citizens have physically and legally blockaded coal production projects and dirty industrial projects.[13] These developments are threatening to the Party, as the price of defeat to China’s leaders is their livelihoods or even their lives.[14] Thus, China’s aggressive efforts to integrate renewable energy into the grid and take unilateral measures to reduce air pollution also reflect a desire to prevent social discontent. These developments reveal a pattern in which international concerns such as climate governance are priorities insofar as they simultaneously address a domestic consideration.
A Wind Farm in Xinjiang, China
Domestic concerns notwithstanding, why did China concede in subsequent negotiations and agree to such an INDC? In must be noted that despite numerous attempts by Western politicians to frame China as a hostile, revisionist power, China has been a willing party in international institutions and governance, being a party to every multilateral environmental conference since 1972, when China gained its seat in the UN, and having signed and ratified numerous environmental treaties, including the Kyoto Protocol, which not even the United States ratified, and the International Convention on Biological Diversity; [15] it must be noted, however, that China took a back-seat role in these treaties. China does not philosophically embrace liberal conceptions of multilateral governance, but despite this, it is sensitive to its global image and does recognize the perks it has accrued from joining the existing system.[16] Notably, after being criticized for its deceitful conduct in COP-15, China opened a pavilion for press corps that wished to monitor negotiations in subsequent climate talks, in a likely attempt to foster transparency. In spite of these advances, however, China continues to retain its identity as a “poor developing nation,” and does its best to form blocs among developing countries to counter the injustices it perceives in the hegemony of the Global North, as well as demanding that developed nations do more to address climate change and make further concessions while still not sacrificing as much on its own.[17] Are these considerations also reflected in China’s INDC?
Despite being lauded as “historic,” some analysts have actually poked holes in China’s INDC and written critiques asserting there is much more room for ambition. For instance, China’s target of reducing carbon intensity 60-65%, as compared to 2005 levels by 2030, builds on an existing target in its five-year plan to cut carbon intensity 40-45% compared to 2005 levels by 2020; China has already achieved a 34% cut. Its choice of a carbon intensity metric, meanwhile, is problematic, as absolute emissions can still rise, and the nation would reap economic benefits from the gains in energy efficiency. With respect to China’s pledge to peak its coal consumption by 2020, coal consumption and production actually fell about 3% last year. This is the product of China’s unilateral measures, but also of low demand from decelerating growth and the ongoing transition from a manufacturing- and export-based economy to a service- and consumption-based one. Finally, with respect to the target to peak carbon emissions by 2030, China’s renewable energy target and the other aforementioned factors indicate that China could actually peak its carbon emissions as early as 2025, and possibly even earlier. Thus, the INDC as it stands does not require significant policy changes to meet compliance.
Prominent Chinese environmental activist Chai Jing (aka China's Rachel Carson), whose 2015 "Under the Dome" documentary about smog was blocked by PRC censors after getting 150 million online views (Source: The Guardian)
When considering China’s domestic considerations and its worldview vis-à-vis the Global North, it is easy to reconcile the superficial discord that exists between its obstructionism during the international climate negotiations and its assertively proactive domestic measures to address climate change. China has a long-term interest in tackling climate change, as it is vulnerable to the destruction that would occur as a result, such as water scarcity, drought, cyclones, and extreme flooding. However, the measures that China has hitherto taken have had the dual purpose of achieving domestic security by mollifying civil discontent from air pollution, diversifying its energy base, and achieving economic growth from sources unrelated to dirty, carbon-intensive industry; and extracting as many concessions as humanly possible from the Global North. In light of these factors, China’s INDC should be considered a floor and not a ceiling of ambition.
This blog post does not seek to vilify China, which in most respects is doing much more to act on climate change than the United States. However, the role “common but differentiated responsibilities” has played in obstructing progress since the inception of the UNFCCC in 1992 cannot be discounted. While it is undeniable that the Global North is responsible for historical emissions, the gap between developed and developing countries is blurry, with China being the largest emitter, and some developing countries being recalcitrant in climate negotiations more out of self-interest than because of legitimate questions of justice and fairness. Just last week, Bolivia released an anti-capitalist manifesto in lieu of an emissions reduction target as part of its INDC. It was rightfully disregarded, with many pointing out the hypocrisy that Bolivia is not only a major oil exporter, but has also sanctioned drilling in areas home to indigenous communities. Fortunately, the international community seems to have recognized the obstructive potential of "common but differentiated responsibilities," with most countries committing to emissions reductions targets irrespective of their economic power, and with developing countries shifting their focus instead to the legitimate issue of technology transfers and green financing from the Global North.
Ultimately, all countries have the right and the obligation to help their citizens escape poverty, but there are multiple trajectories of development that countries can embark on in the quest for a rise in living standards. Repeating the deadly mistakes of the Global North should not have to be one of them, and COP-21 presents an opportunity to put us on the right track. As for China, with the emergence of a booming market for stylish air pollution face masks, it is likely that policymakers have also gotten the message.
Air pollution face masks in vogue
References
[1] Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 271-272.
[2] David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 152.
[3] Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 272.
[4] Ibid, 18.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Ibid, 271.
[8] Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 272.
[9] Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 271.
[10] Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 7.
[11] Andrew J. Nathan and Andrew Scobell, China’s Search for Security (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 270.
[12] Naomi Klein, “This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate”, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 351.
[13] Ibid, 347-351.
[14] Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 6-7.
[15] David Shambaugh, China Goes Global: The Partial Power, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 153.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid.
